
The Cult of Bailout |
What single word best characterizes policy responses in this on-going financial crisis? “BAILOUT”. It goes something like this. You take a lot of risk and reap lots of rewards (be it in pay, bonus, or social programs). You get into trouble. The government bails you out. How often have we seen this same story repeating? It seems like we are in an infinite loop. But we aren’t. This cannot last forever. The bailouts have many implications – some seen immediately and some will play out later. On the positive side, bailouts buy time and short-term stability. Importantly, we see the results immediately. A good example was the big jump in world stock markets when the EU announced its 750 billion Euro bailout. On the negative side, the list is longer. Also importantly, you do not see the results immediately. Here are a few of the implications:
I have some other thoughts.
The PIIGS BailoutI don’t get it. I don’t understand the market reaction. Before I forget, the IMF has pledged 250 billion Euros. The U.S. share is 17.09%. Hence, the U.S. has ponied up 42.7 billion Euro or about $55 billion. This does not include the potential costs of opening up the swap lines again. I haven’t seen much talk about this. Is this the best use of our $55 billion? I am not going to rehash all of the arguments. Basic macro suggests that when you join currency union (or if you peg your currency) you give up your monetary policy. In the Greek crises in the 1970s and 1980s, a simple response was that the Drachma was devalued. This effectively meant the cost was shared by the people of Greece (higher inflation is like a tax) and the international investors who bought risky assets that were all of the sudden worth a lot less. While giving up your monetary policy seems like a cost, in some situations, it is a good thing. The Greek monetary policy had no credibility. Given their track record, people did not believe their central bank when they said they would control money growth (and inflation). As a result, it was expensive for both the Greek government and Greek corporations to raise money. The currency union solves this problem and gives instant credibility – and lower interest rates which could spur growth in Greece (and other countries that benefit with lower financing costs). All this is fine in theory. However, to get the currency union to work – there must be enforcement mechanisms. As we know now, there were no enforcement mechanisms. As a result, some countries continued to spend and got into a terrible mess. The EU was powerless and had to bring in a “bad guy” — the IMF to do a clean up job. The lesson is not a new one. The currency union does not work without a political union (or at least enforceable actions that, by definition, infringe on sovereignty). But now we are at the point that I do not understand. Germany had a highly credible monetary policy before the Euro. As the largest and strongest economy, it now has to pay for all the countries that go offsides. Consider the major benefits for Germany. It is a fact that Germany depends on trade. A common currency makes trade easier. However, in this age of electronic FX trading, it really doesn’t seem like that big of a deal. That is, yes it decreases the transaction costs of trading goods, but isn’t this saving more than offset by the bailout costs? It is a fact that Germany is the largest and strongest economy in Europe. A common currency would mean that the Bundesbank would effectively be controlling the monetary policy in Europe. The volatility of some countries’ monetary policies was disruptive to Germany. But surely the disruption caused by these small countries are small change compared to the massive bailouts the Germans are sponsoring. The Euro was but one step in a series of EU measures that levels the playing field in Europe for corporations. That is, the cost of trading is not just the cost of converting DMs into FFs. For example, some German goods might not be competitive in France because of French government subsidies. The level playing field would directly benefit German trade. However, and this is crucial, you don’t need to have a common currency to have a level playing field in terms of the regulatory and government environments. Indeed, a recent research piece that I am writing shows that most of the benefits to Europe came from standardizing regulations – not from the introduction of the Euro. Consider the costs. These are well known. I do not want to go through the list which is constantly in the press. Let me make just a few remarks.
Enough complaining. What to do?The solutions are not easy. I am an advocate of short-term pain for long-term gain. Essentially, you drastically restructure (i.e. partially default) the debt. This means that the investors share the burden. As a result, you do not need 750 billion Euro.. Given the EU has no current mechanisms to enforce, you still have to rely on the IMF for some bridge financing. The financing carries very strict conditions (much more aggressive than the proposals on the table). In order to survive as a common currency, the rules of the Euro Zone must change. Greece is put on a three year probation period for the Euro. If certain conditions are not met, they go back to the Drachma. Going back to the Drachma, would also serve to revalue the sovereign debt. The Greek government would likely change the currency of their sovereign debt to Drachma effectively (partially) defaulting. How dramatic is this? You don’t have to go back in history that far to see that the U.S. did the same thing in 1971. In a speech on August 15, 1971 President Nixon suspended the convertibility of the dollar (at the time it was fixed so that $35 bought an ounce of gold). This immediately revalued U.S. debt because gold was trading in the $40 range. Same for the peripheral countries – and the main countries in the Euro Zone. Any country offside automatically goes out of the EZ. Every member faces the same deadline as Greece to put their house in order. The mechanism is quantitative and not subjective. No exceptions are allowed. Countries must stay out of the EZ for three years and then are eligible to reapply. Yes, this will cause problems for some banks that hold the sovereign debt. The weak ones might fail. However, the economies will be benefit from the purging of weak banks and the reallocation of their productive resources to make other banks stronger. |


Campbell, small detail:
During the 1923 hyper-inflation in Germany the currency would have been just the Mark (also aptly known as the Papiermark = paper Mark), not Deutsche Mark (DM).
To end hyperinflation, the Rentenmark was introduced at the end of 1923 (followed a year later by the Reichsmark). Good old Deutsche Mark (DM) came about only after WW II in 1948.
(As you see, that episode is indeed well remembered – my grandmother told me about it many times.)